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Abstract
The event of the recent financial crisis raises the question of whether policy makers
could have done more or  something different  to  prevent  the  build-up of financial
imbalances. This paper contributes to the field of regulatory impact by tackling the
debate on whether central  banks should ‘lean against the wind’, while in case the
response is positive, how macroprudential policies should be combined with monetary
policy. Using an augmented Taylor rule and a sample of 127 global economies, the
results  provide  evidence  on  the  importance  of  macroprudential  issues  for  the
implementation of an effective monetary policy. They also document that the type of
adopted  macroprudential  instrument  has a substantial  effect  on such effectiveness,
with this policy mix being less ‘integrated’ when the monetary rule aims at primarily
safeguarding  inflation  stability.  The  results  survive  robustness  checks  under
alternative assets.
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I. Introduction
The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  study  the  policy  mix  between  monetary  and
macroprudential  policy.  More  specifically,  it  explores  the  role  of  macroprudential
policies through an augmented Taylor policy rule that explicitly considers not only
inflation and the output gap, but also the financial  gap, i.e. whether the combined
actions of monetary and macroprudential policies are considered a complementarity,
so as  to  preserve  financial  stability.  The methodology,  after  estimating  individual
(augmented) Taylor rules for 127 global countries, considers the coefficient response
to the financial gap as an explanatory variable that is representative of the relationship
3between this policy mix. The novelties of this work are threefold: i) the empirical
analysis  generates  estimations  of augmented  Taylor  rules for economies  that  were
never before part of the empirical literature, ii) new evidence on the combined role of
monetary  and  macroprudential  policies  that  ensures  overall  economic  stability  is
provided, and iii) new evidence on incorporating the housing market, given that asset
prices contain information about future inflation, while certain central banks directly
try to offset any disequilibria issues in these markets. 
Macroprudential policies, i.e. caps on loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios,
limits on credit growth, balance sheet restrictions, capital and reserve requirements,
are of primary concern to reduce systemic risks in financial markets. While emerging
markets have used them extensively, advanced economies have started only recently
to adopt them. A growing literature has documented the use of these policies across
countries and analyzed their effects (Freixas et al. 2015; Claessens 2015). In a recent
paper, Cerutti et al. (2016) document the use of macroprudential policies for a large
number of countries,  while  covering many instruments.  They provide evidence on
which policies have been most effective in terms of reducing the growth of credit,
covering  both  household  and  corporate  sector  credit,  while  exploring  differences
among types of countries (i.e., advanced versus emerging), and whether policies work
better in different phases of the financial cycle. 
Macroprudential  policies  should  be  coordinated  with  monetary  policy  to
ensure not only the target of price (primarily) and output stability, but also that of
financial stability. However, a critical question is whether monetary policy should be
more ‘lean’. A number of studies have recommended that augmenting the Taylor rule
(1993) with a financial target to allow the interest rate to react to financial stress was
the first way researchers and policy makers considered to highlight the end of the so-
called  ‘separation  principle’  (Christiano  et  al.  2010;  Curdia  and Woodford,  2010;
Issing, 2011). It has been also the event of the recent financial crisis that has shifted
the  strategic  considerations  about  monetary  policy  and  weakened  the  strategy  of
‘cleaning up afterwards’. The presence of macroprudential instruments has radically
heated the debate ‘clean’ versus ‘lean’. The supporters of the augmented Taylor rule
are in favor that policy makers need as many instruments as targets. Hence, if interest
rates  cannot  do  everything  alone,  potentially  they  can  be  complements  to
macroprudential  instruments,  and can  provide  coordination  between monetary  and
4macroprudential policies. Interest rates primarily target monetary stability, while they
act  timely  on  financial  stability  as  complements  to  macroprudential  instruments,
giving support to the integrated approach in which monetary and financial stability are
integrated into an ‘augmented’ Taylor rule. In contrast, the separate approach of the
policy-mix  does  not  consider  that  the  interest  rate  can  ever  respond  to  financial
stability, while the macroprudential policy is targeting financial stability. Within the
relevant literature, Adrian and Shin (2009), Mishkin (2011) and Eichengreen et al.
(2011)  intensively  advocate  the  integrated  approach  of  the  policy  mix  between
monetary  and macroprudential  policies.  The argument  in  favor  of  the  role  of  the
interest rate in financial regulation is that under an augmented Taylor rule, not only
banks, but also the whole financial  system, experience financial  imbalances,  while
there  is  inadequate  supportive  evidence  for  the  effectiveness  of  macroprudential
instruments  (Agénor  and  Pereira  da  Silva,  2013).  By  contrast,  Svensson  (2012)
supports the separate approach, while he is against the effectiveness of interest rates to
guarantee financial  instability.  In certain circumstances, such as the 2008 financial
crisis, monetary policy may deviate from its traditional objectives to support financial
stability. 
However, monetary policy, if left alone, may fail to ensure financial stability,
potentially when its  credibility  may suffer because i) crises will most likely occur
despite leaning against the wind, and ii) the central bank under delivers on inflation,
and thus could destabilize inflation expectations, thus, increasing real debt and real
interest  payments on debt,  undermining financial  stability.  Most importantly is the
limitation of monetary policy to model people’s economic behavior, i.e. that towards
undertaking  risk.  Either  within  a  banking  or  capital  market  there  are  waves  of
optimism and pessimism that move expectations irrationally, giving rise to irrational
investment decisions that are neither sustainable nor socially desirable, undermining
financial stability with further repercussions to the real economy. Stein (2013) argues
that  monetary  policy  is  an  ineffective  and  counterproductive  way  of  promoting
financial  stability,  i.e.  it  has  small  and  uncertain  effects  on  the  probability  of  a
financial crisis.
To briefly foreshadow our empirical findings, they document that the type of
macroprudential instrument impacts the macroprudential-monetary policy mix. This is
expected to have significant policy implications on the effectiveness of certain types
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macroprudential  policy that  guarantees  financial  stability.  The set  up of the paper
continues  as  follows.  Section  II  explains  the  methodology  with  respect  to  the
monetary rules estimations and that of the impact of macroprudential policies on the
policy mix. Section III describes the data, while Section IV presents the empirical
results. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. Methodology
The analysis makes use of a forward-looking Taylor rule which describes how central
banks respond both to the expected inflation deviations and to the expected output
gap. Among the forward-looking rules (FLR), the most prominent is that proposed by
Clarida et al. (1998; 2000):
it=α+β [E (π t+n )− π´ ]+γ E( y¿¿t+q)¿                                                             
(1)
where  β  and  γ  are  the  coefficients  for  the  inflation  gap  and  the  output  gap,
respectively.  They also introduce a constant term α= i*-βπ ̅,  where i* denotes the
equilibrium nominal interest rate, and π ̅ is the inflation target. Given the output gap,
when the expected inflation rate is higher than the inflation target, the nominal rate
increases  and  this  reduces  investment  and  consumption  plans,  leading  to  reduced
aggregate  demand, and to lower inflation.  The Taylor  rule  can provide a nominal
anchor  for  the  central  bank  to  react  to  various  shocks,  as  well  as  an  automatic
stabilizer for the macroeconomy.
The  forward  looking rule  is  estimated  through the  Generalized  Method  of
Moment (GMM) methodological approach (Clarida et al., 1998, 2000; Castro, 2011).
With the instrument list containing lagged values of inflation,  the output gap, and
interest rates: 
it=(1−ρ ) (α+ β π t+1+γ y t+1 )+ρ it−1+ ε t                                                           (2)
following Castro (2011) and incorporating the interest rate smoothing process into the
model, Equation (2) yields the following reduced form:
it=Ф0+Ф1 π t+1+Ф2 y t+1 + ρ it−1+εt                                                                   (3)
where Ф0 = (1-) α, Ф1 = (1-) β, and  Ф2 = (1-) γ.  
6Although we do not restrict  the estimates  to be strictly positive,  we think of as a
desirable outcome such findings. Only if monetary policy responds to an increase in
both inflation and output growth by systematically raising the policy rate, the central
bank is capable of stabilizing the economy and delivering price stability. Moreover,
we  do  not  restrict  either,  but  we  desire  the  estimated  rules  to  fulfill  the  Taylor
principle,  i.e.  the  requirement  of  a  more  than  proportional  response  of  the policy
interest rate to movements in the inflation rate. 
Equation (3), however, does not explicitly consider the role of asset prices as
monetary policy targets.  The literature is still  uncertain on whether and how asset
prices should be taken explicitly into account in formulating monetary policy (Taylor,
2001;  Clarida,  2001).  Several  major  central  banks  have  started  considering  the
increase in financial instability, especially after the recent financial crisis. Therefore,
we augment the Taylor rule, described by Equation (3), to account for the deviations
of asset prices from their target (Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). However, Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) argue that only past asset price disequilibria could affect policy rates,
implying  that  central  banks  intervene  only  when  asset  prices  deviate  from
equilibrium, rather than anticipating potential misalignments. Following Rigobon and
Sack (2003), Chadha et al. (2004), Siklos and Bohl (2008) and Fuhrer and Tootell
(2008), Equation (3) gives:
it=Ф0+Ф1 π t+1+Ф2 y t+1+Ф3 apt−1 + ρ it−1+εt                                            (4)
where  apt-1 denotes  asset  prices  at  period  t-1.  To  stabilize  asset  prices,  Ф3 >  0,
implying  that  whenever  asset  prices  positively  (negatively)  deviate  from  their
equilibrium,  the monetary authorities  increase  (decrease)  policy  rates  to  offset  the
anomalous  price  dynamics.  This  augmented  Taylor  policy  rule  has  explicitly
considered a financial stability proxy, which can take various forms in the literature,
i.e. credit spreads (Curdi and Woodford, 2010), asset prices, credit (Christiano et al.,
2010; Agénor and Pereira da Silva, 2013) or money (Issing, 2011).
III. Data
Monetary policy rules
Our sample covers various time spans, depending on data availability (Appendix 1).
All data are on a quarterly basis and are obtained from the International Financial
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interest  rates,  as the three-month interbank market  interest  rates,  the inflation rate
measured as changes of the Consumer Price Index (except in the case of the Eurozone
where inflation is measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)),
all  seasonally  adjusted  using  the  Census  X12  procedure,  and  the  output  gap
determined as the difference between the actual value log of seasonally adjusted GDP
and its trend value obtained by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Details on data can
been found in Appendix 3.
For  the  case  of  OECD countries  real-time  forecasts  are  used (Orphanides,
2001) based on the information actually available, reflecting the real-time perception
by the central bank and the private sector of the state of the economy. The benefit of
using real-time forecasts makes the analysis robust to the Lucas critique, while they
allow policy makers to align explicitly the horizon of the inflation forecast and the
control lag for monetary policy. Unfortunately,  for the remaining countries, policy
makers do not have access to inflation or output data of the current period, i.e. they do
not have the knowledge about how policymakers form their expectations on inflation
and output gaps. To compute the expected output gap and inflation rates the analysis
constructs autoregressive models based upon both the AIC and the BIC criteria. The
selected models are then used recursively to compute the h-step ahead forecasts for
both  series  (the  results  are  available  upon request).  To ensure  the  validity  of  the
forecasts, as well as to investigate forecast rationality, the analysis tests the optimality
of such forecasts through the density forecast criterion (Diebold et al., 1998), which
allows researchers to test whether their forecasting model is not significantly different
from the model that generated the actual data. In this case, the forecasting model is
optimal. The findings confirmed the validity of the forecasts (they are also available
upon request).
Additionally, a critical aspect of policy rules in the form of Equation (4) is the
emphasis  they  place  on  a  concept  of  the  economy’s  potential  level  of  economic
activity for calculating the output gap (Orphanides, 2003). In theory, various different
approaches  of  potential  output  exist  (e.g.,  flexible-price-output,  the  steady-state-
output, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), the linear,
and HP-filtered-trend) and it is unclear which of the concepts is the most appropriate
for  estimating  the  cyclical  position  of  the  economy.  The  choice  is  not  without
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of the output gap implies major welfare losses within a class of policy rules that rely
upon measures of the gap. To the empirical ends of this analysis, the HP filtering
approach is followed. Finally, to measure the financial market touch in Equation (4),
the  analysis  uses  the  stock  price  index  (Datastream  stock  price  indices  for  each
country). Especially for the Eurozone, the proxy makes use of a weighted average of
the Eurozone countries stock indices, with weights being the capitalization of each
stock market. 
Macroprudential policy tools
The main source of the macroprudential dataset is obtained from the IMF survey on
Global  Macroprudential  Policy  Instruments  (GMPI),  carried  out  by  Luis  Jacome,
Yitae Kim and Claudia Jadrijevic. The central banks, as well as the Central Bank of
West  African  States  (BCEAO)  provided  responses  to  more  than  100  detailed
questions on about 17 key macroprudential policy tools. 
The analysis focuses on 12 macroprudential instruments included in the GMPI
Survey. The survey covers 18 sections/instruments, while due to lack of adequate data
and cross-sectional coverage, the analysis does not include: Sector Specific Capital
Buffer/Requirements,  Liquidity  Requirements/Buffers,  Loan-to-Deposit  ratios,
Margins/Haircuts on Collateralized Financial  Market Transactions,  Limits on Open
FX Positions or Currency Mismatches, and Other policies. The tools include: General
Countercyclical  Capital  Buffer/Requirements  (2),  Leverage  Ratios  (1),  Dynamic
Loan-Loss Provisioning (2), Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratios (2), Debt-to-Income (DTI)
Ratios  (1),  Limits  on  Domestic  Currency  Loans  (3),  Limits  on  Foreign  Currency
Loans (3), Reserve Requirement Ratios (2), Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions (2),
Capital  Surcharges  on  Systemically  Important  Financial  Institutions  (SIFIs)  (2),
Limits  on  Interbank  Exposures  (2),  Concentration  Limits  (3).  The  number  in
parenthesis indicates whether it is in relevance to the borrowers (1), or to the lenders
(2), or to capital flows (3). This assignment is substantially important for the main
part  of the empirical  analysis.  Details  for the countries  that  have adopted specific
macroprudential tools over the relevant time span are provided in Appendix 1. In case
9that  more than two types of macroprudential  tools have been adopted by a single
country, the analysis uses the one with the highest prevalence.
IV. Empirical analysis
Monetary policy rules estimates
First,  the  analysis  estimates  the  monetary  policy  Taylor  rule  (Equation  (4))  that
considers a forward-looking monetary policy and the inertia reflected by the interest
rate smoothing. The estimations are achieved with the help of the Generalized Method
of Moments  (GMM), where the analysis  uses the conventional  set  of instruments,
which includes the lags of the variables  involved in the rule seen as instrumental
factors,  as  long  as  they  influence  the  past  behavior  of  the  regressors,  while
uncorrelated  with  residuals.  In  particular,  instrumental  variables  considered  are  a
constant,  previous  values  of  inflation,  interest  rates,  and  GDP  potential  output
changes. In estimating the GMM equations, a heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
consistent  (HAC)  estimator  based  on  the  Bartlett  kernel  with  Newey-West  fixed
bandwidth  selection.  The  reliability  of  the  estimates,  along  with  the  validity  of
instruments, is evaluated by the Sargan–Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2 in the number of restrictions. A rejection of the null
hypothesis, i.e. instruments are orthogonal to errors, indicates that the estimates are
not consistent. The findings in Table 1 display that across all countries, the Hansen J-
statistic supports the validity of instruments. 
A number of interesting  results  stand out from the estimations  in  Table 1.
First,  for many cases  the estimation  of the inflation  coefficient  is  less than unity,
except  in  the  cases  of:  Nepal,  Armenia,  Kenya,  Philippines,  China,  Dominican
Republic,  Mexico,  Mongolia,  Czech  Republic,  Eurozone,  Hungary,  Kuwait,  New
Zealand, Poland, U.K., and U.S. Taylor (1993) points out that inflation stabilization
occurs only if the inflation gap coefficient is greater than one. This conclusion, known
as the Taylor principle (Woodford, 2001), stresses that a stabilizing monetary policy
must increase the interest rate more than proportionally than inflation (Clarida et al.,
2000).  Therefore,  in  these  countries,  the  estimates  of  inflation  coefficients  are
indicative  of  central  banks’  strong commitment  to  anchor  medium to  longer  term
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inflation expectations, while a successful stabilization policy requires a more forward-
looking approach, given that monetary policy operates with a lag.  In terms of the
output coefficient, most of the cases provide results less than unity, except in the cases
of: Gambia, Haiti, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Ecuador, Eurozone, and Venezuela. 
The  estimated  coefficients  associated  with  stock  price  disequilibria  are
positive (as theoretically expected) for each country examined, albeit they are small in
absolute value. Interestingly, the coefficient is not always statistically significant for
each  country.  At  face  value  these  results  may  suggest  that  the  central  banks
(especially  in  the  countries  in  which  the  coefficient  turns  out  to  be  statistically
significant) target asset prices, implying that they attempt to stabilize them in much
the same way as they stabilize inflation/output. However, central banks have often
been clear that they do not target asset prices, either because they are not necessarily
related to the objectives of monetary policy or because they are only important insofar
as they provide information about expected inflation. Given the raised interest in the
role  of  financial  stability,  such  prices  are  expected  to  more  frequently  enter  the
monetary policy target function. Clarida (2001) argues that asset prices play a role in
helping to get closer to the central banks’ forecasting information set, implying that
central banks do not target asset prices per se, but use them as good information since
their disequilibria are important in determining interest rate targets at times that are
easily recognizable as large misalignments. Finally, the policy smoothing coefficient
on  the  lagged  interest-rate  indicates  a  generally  high  degree  of  inertia  across  all
countries in the sample. 
[Table 1 here]
Monetary policy and macroprudential policy estimates
This part of the empirical  analysis explores the policy mix between monetary and
macroprudential  policy. We have already mentioned two polar cases of this policy
mix: the ‘separate policy mix’, i.e. monetary policy remains focused on monetary and
macroeconomic stability, while macroprudential policy focuses on financial stability,
and an ‘integrated policy mix’, i.e. monetary policy assists macroprudential policy in
its  financial  stability  goal.  Accordingly,  the  more  the  interest  rate  responses  to
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financial conditions, the greater the probability of adopting an integrated policy mix.
The  intensity  of  this  response  is  directly  informed  through  the  coefficient  Ф3in
Equation  (4),  where  this  coefficient  constitutes  the  dependent  variable  of  a  new
model.
The response coefficients  on inflation,  Ф1,  and the output gap,  Ф2,  are the
explanatory variables in this new model. Based on Woodford’s hypothesis (2012), the
analysis considers the presence of a tradeoff between macroeconomic (i.e., inflation,
production) and financial stability. The main argument against the involvement of the
central  bank  in  preserving  financial  stability  lies  in  the  possibility  of  conflicting
objectives damaging the credibility of the central bank's price stability goal (Smets,
2013). The analysis expects a negative sign for the explanatory variable  Ф1 and a
negative  relationship  between  these  two  independent  variables  (Ф1,  Ф2)  and  the
dependent variable (Ф3). While the analysis can actually expect a negative coefficient
for inflation, the expected sign for output is less clear. If the central bank is more a
‘dove’ type of a bank than a ‘hawk’ type, it is more concerned with output and may be
more open to other goals than inflation, i.e. financial stability, as an additional goal.
As a result, the sign for the output variable is highly ambiguous.
The new model also introduces the variable  of interest,  in relevance to the
macroprudential  policy.  Based  on  the  approach  by  Blanchard  et  al.  (2013),  the
macroprudential  instruments  are  divided  into  three  classifications  according  to
whether they constrain lenders, borrowers or capital  flows. To this end, a dummy
variable  is  introduced,  mp,  which  takes  the  value  of  2  when  the  chosen
macroprudential  instrument  directly  affects  borrowers,  1  when  it  directly  affects
lenders, and 0 when it directly affects capital flows (for more details, see Appendix
1). The sign of this variable can be interpreted as follows: a positive (negative) sign
indicates  that  macroprudential  instruments  affecting  borrowers  promote  greater
(weaker) intensity of the response of monetary policy to financial conditions (i.e., a
more  integrated  (separated)  policy-mix)  than  instruments  constraining  lenders  or
restricted capital flows. A statistically significant coefficient identifies that the type of
macroprudential  influences  the policy mix between monetary and macroprudential
policy. Conversely, a statistically insignificant coefficient suggests neutrality of the
macroprudential instrument type for the policy mix.
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Additionally, the regression analysis introduces other control variables as well.
First,  it  introduces the type of the chosen measure of financial  stability.  Financial
stability  targets  are  various,  but  they  can  be  divided  into  two  broad  categories,
depending on whether they involve credit (and therefore relate to the regulation of the
credit  cycle)  or  involve  assets  prices  (stock  or  real  estate  prices);  therefore,  the
analysis uses a dummy variable, denoted Target, taking the value of 1 when the target
is with asset prices, 0 if it is linked to credit. The sign is interpreted by considering the
influence of the first type of targets (i.e., credit) to the second type (i.e., prices) (the
details of the definition of that dummy are in Appendix 1). 
Finally,  the  countries  identification  can  be  also  a  potentially  important
explanatory  variable.  There  are  papers  (Turner,  2012;  Hahm et  al.,  2012)  on  the
specificities  of  the  monetary/macroprudential  policy  mix  in  emerging  economies.
These  countries  have been using  more intensively  and frequently  macroprudential
policies than advanced economies, as they are more vulnerable to reversals of capital
flows  (Lim  et  al.,  2011;  Rey,  2013).  This  issue  has  gained  relevance  with
unconventional  monetary  policy  measures  adopted  by  the  central  banks  of
industrialized countries to cope with the financial crisis. As highlighted by Hahm et
al. (2012), unconventional monetary policies have made the combination of monetary
and  macroprudential  policy  in  emerging  countries  more  important  than  it  was.
Similarly,  Agénor and Pereira  da Silva  (2013) propose to  combine  an  augmented
Taylor rule and macroprudential policy to better manage systemic risk in emerging
markets. To this end, the analysis adds an explanatory variable, names as ‘Country’,
based on the IMF classification between advanced and emerging economies. It takes
the form of a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the country is emerging,
and 0 if it is advanced. The regression model takes the following form:
Ф3 = intercept + b1 Ф1 + b2 Ф2 + b3 mp + b4 Target + b5 Country 
where Ф3 indicates the response to financial conditions in the rule, Ф1 is the response
to the deviation of inflation from its target in the rule, Ф2 is the response to the output
gap in the rule, mp indicates the type of macroprudential instrument, Target denotes
the  type  of  financial  target  in  the  rule,  and  Country  denotes  the  type  of  country
represented (emerging vs advanced). The analysis applies the simple ordinary least
squares (OLS) methodology (Bineau, 2010), while it standardizes the variables by
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subtracting  from  each  observation  the  mean,  and  dividing  this  difference  by  the
standard deviation of all observations. 
The results,  based  on different  variants,  are  reported  in  Table  2.  The first
variant does not use any control variables, while the remaining include the two control
variables,  one  at  a  time.  In terms of  the  macroprudential  coefficient,  the  findings
indicate  that  the  type  of  macroprudential  instrument  impacts  the
macroprudential/monetary  policy  mix.  Across  all  three  variants,  a  statistically
significant  and  negative  coefficient  is  obtained,  implying  that  macroprudential
instruments constraining borrowers directly reduce the response of monetary policy to
financial  stability,  vis-à-vis  those  that  constrain  lenders  or  capital  flows.  Hence,
constraining borrowers’ instruments, the lower favorable is a Taylor rule augmented
for  targeting  financial  stability.  In  contrast,  models  that  retain  macroprudential
instruments  constraining  lenders  or  capital  flows,  consider  further  actions  by  the
central bank to target financial instability along with macroprudential policy.
The response coefficient to inflation appears to influence significantly, albeit
to  a  lesser  extent  than  the  macroprudential  instrument,  the  intensity  of  monetary
policy  response  to  financial  stability.  This  coefficient  is  negative  and  statistically
significant, implying that the inflation/financial stability tradeoff does exist. The more
the central bank is ‘hawkish’, the less it seeks to mix monetary and macroprudential
policies via an augmented Taylor rule. In terms of the response to the output gap, the
findings  favor the presence of a negative  and statistically  significant  case,  i.e.  the
response to the output gap also appears to influence the policy-mix. With respect to
the remaining two control variables, the findings indicate that the country variable is
positive and statistically significant (at 5%), indicating that the policy mix depends on
the  specific  constraints  involved.  With  respect  to  the  target  variable,  the  results
highlight that when asset prices are the primary target of macroprudential policies, the
policy mix is directly affected.
[Table 2 here]
Table 3 reports the policy mix results by the type of macroprudential tool applied in
each  country,  i.e.  on  lenders,  on  borrowers  and  on  capital  flows  (based  on  the
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classification  in  Appendix  1).  These  findings  clearly  document  that  it  is  the
macroprudential  tools  on  lenders  that  generate  the  strongest  trade-off  between
macroeconomic and macroprudential policies, followed by tools on capital flows and
borrowers (i.e.,  -0.328, -0.242 and -0.073, respectively).  These findings imply that
‘leaning against the wind’ monetary policy pays closer attention to the course of the
interest rate to stabilize both output and inflation, but also takes into account credit,
borrowing and capital flows issues. This joint adoption of a triple-mandate Taylor rule
and  macroprudential  regulation  allows  the  policymakers  to  reduce  any  conflict
between price, output and financial stability (Howitt, 2011; Blanchard et al., 2013).
Macroprudential  regulation  cannot  be  seen  independently  from  macroeconomic
dynamics. Such regulatory issues are complementary to monetary policy in taming
macroeconomic  instability,  while  increasing the resilience  of  the financial  system.
These results are in line with the results of Jordá et al. (2015) who argue that the joint
adoption  of  ‘leaning  against  the  wind’  monetary  strategies  and  macroprudential
policies  allows  reduced  excessive  swings  in  credit  and  leverage  growth,  thus,
minimizing the risk of dangerous financially-originated recessions.
[Table 3 here]
These findings align with the arguments that central banks should pay strong attention
onto  potential  trade-offs  between  the  objectives  of  macroeconomic  and  financial
stability.  This happens because price stability  is associated with increased risks of
financial  instability,  while  low  inflation  can  foster  asset  price  bubbles,  due  to
increased incentives for investors to take on more risk. If central banks realize the
economy’s  macroeconomic  course is  endangered  because  financial  institutions  are
unpredictable  in  assuming  financial  and  investment  risk  (i.e.,  higher  financial
solvencies  and  deteriorating  financial  liquidity),  may  find  it  hard  to  fight  such
undesirable events just by giving emphasis on macroeconomic stability (Woodward,
2000).  The imminent  event  of a  financial  crisis  warrantees  the implementation  of
sound  macroprudential  policies,  otherwise,  the  costs  of  potential  defaults  can  be
substantially  high (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Overall,  our empirical  findings can
infer that we cannot ignore the link between macroeconomic and financial stability as
it is reflected through a monetary rule and as it is dictated by the globalization of
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financial  markets.  Nevertheless,  the  findings  need  to  be  interpreted  with  caution.
There are arguments that adding a financial stability objective to monetary policy may
confuse markets and jeopardize commitments to price stability, thus, making it more
difficult to maintain macroeconomic stability. In addition, macroprudential policy has
been also received criticism on the grounds that it is more subject to lobbying and
political  pressures.  Igan  and Mishra  (2011),  for  instance,  present  the  case  on  the
worldwide reaction of the financial sector to the new Basel rules for higher capital
requirements.
The  next  part  of  the  empirical  analysis,  reported  in  Table  4,  repeats  the
analysis in Table 2, but now the findings are considered across country classifications
(the  country  variable  is  not  included).  The  results  document  that  although  the
estimates retain their sign as in the overall case, there are differentiated sizes of the
estimated coefficients. In particular, the macroprudential policy coefficient, b3, turns
out to be greater in the case of low income countries (although the low number of
observations could jeopardize the validity  of the results  in this  case) that seem to
extensively  use such policies,  mainly as a part  of maintaining  their  exchange rate
regime. Similarly, the lower middle income countries coefficient follows, while the
high income countries coefficient displays the lowest value, probably indicating the
less  emphasis  these  countries  put  on  macroprudential  policies  to  target  financial
stability. In terms of the inflation coefficient, the size has the greatest value in the case
of the high income countries that seem to exercise the most ‘hawkish’ price stability
type of monetary policy, while in terms of the output gap coefficient the largest values
come from both the high income and the low income countries that consider welfare
losses for their societies, along with their financial stability target.
[Table 4 here]
Robustness checks: Monetary rules with house prices
Given that the literature argues that incorporating stock prices into the monetary rule
is subject to the problematic finding that a positive response to stock prices does not
necessarily  imply  the  central  bank’s  response  to  potential  bubbles  (Lee  and  Son,
2013),  this  part  subjects  the  results  presented  so  far  to  robustness  checks  by
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introducing explicitly into the rule house prices instead of stock prices (the author
thanks a reviewer for pointing out this). The theoretical background of this approach
lies back to the role of the credit channel as an efficient transmission mechanism of
monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Baum et al., 2003). Frictions in the
credit  market,  i.e. asymmetric information and/or imperfect contract enforceability,
generate  a  wedge between the  opportunity  cost  of  internal  funds  and the  cost  of
external funds, i.e. an external finance premium, both for consumers and firms. Given
certain conditions in the housing finance market, such as the depth of the funding
system for housing finance, restrictions and regulations on depository institutions, and
the sharing of housing credit risk, the workings of credit housing can substantially
affect  the  effectiveness  of  this  channel  through  its  impact  on  the  dependence  of
housing  finance  institutions  on  retail  deposits  (Iacoviello  and  Minetti,  2007).
Therefore, policy makers should pay a closer attention to housing credit and markets,
given that the presence of credit constraints for housing borrowers and house price
expectations  can  significantly  affect  net  worth  and  borrowing  capacity,  with  real
effects on the economy. To this end and following Gelain et al. (2013), Equation (4)
yields:
it=Ф0+Ф1 π t+1+Ф2 y t+1+Ф3 ghpt−1+¿ ρ it−1+εt                        (5)
where ghp is the growth rate of house prices. For the empirical estimation of Equation
(5) we managed to get data on house prices only for 67 countries in our sample (the
new country sample is shown in Appendix 2). The results for the GMM estimates of
the  new  monetary  rule  are  reported  in  Table  5.  They  illustrate  that  while  the
coefficients on inflation and the output gap retain their previous explanatory size and
power, the coefficient on house prices is much greater vis-à-vis that on stock prices in
the majority of the countries in the new sample. In addition, diagnostics still confirm
the statistical adequacy of estimates.
[Table 5 here]
Next, the robustness check part focuses on the (new) policy mix between monetary
and macroprudential  policy.  The intensity  of  this  mix  is  directly  informed by the
coefficient  Ф3that  proxies  the  estimates  on  house  prices  in  Equation  (5),  which
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constitutes the dependent variable of the new model, with the response coefficients on
inflation,  Ф1,  and  the  output  gap,  Ф2,  are  still  the  explanatory  variables  in  the
modeling approach. The robustness analysis  retains  the three classifications of the
macroprudential instruments, as well as the previous control variables considered in
the  main  text  of  the  analysis.  The  regression  model  looks  like  that  considered
previously:
Ф3 = intercept + b1 Ф1 + b2 Ф2 + b3 mp + b4 Target + b5 Country 
but this time Ф3 is the response to financial conditions in the Taylor rule with house
prices.  Following  the  same  estimation  methodology  and  the  conventional
‘standardization’ of the variables, the new results are reported in Table 6. Again, the
first variant does not make use of any control variables, while the remaining variants
include  the  two control  variables,  one  at  a  time.  In  terms  of  the  macroprudential
coefficient, the findings indicate that the type of macroprudential instrument has again
an impact on the macroprudential/monetary policy mix. The results remain consistent
across all three variants, while they are similar to those in Table 2, indicating again
that macroprudential instruments constraining borrowers directly reduce the response
of monetary policy to financial stability, and are less favorable to the integrated policy
mix in comparison to instruments that constrain lenders and/or capital  flows. Only
this time, this effect has turned out to be stronger. 
[Table 6 here]
V. Conclusion
The empirical literature has found solid evidence that monetary policy is capable of
ensuring  financial  stability.  This  paper  set  up  an  empirical  methodology  through
which it demonstrated that the instrument of the interest rate (in an augmented Taylor
rule) could affect not only price and output stability, but also safeguarded financial
stability. Using a sample of 127 global economies and the estimations of the Taylor
rule,  the  analysis  documented  that  the  type  of  macroprudential  instrument  could
impact the macroprudential/monetary policy mix. These results survived robustness
checks in which stock prices in the monetary rules were replaced by house prices. 
18
These findings have substantial policy implications since they illustrate that
certain types of macroprudential instruments can be more favorable than others to a
strong link between monetary and macroprudential policy to ensure financial stability.
The findings could also influence the direction in which monetary policy can guide
macroprudential  regulation.  Should  monetary  policy  internalize  the  regulator’s
problem and therefore, ‘lean against financial imbalances’, or what really matters is
the merit of coordination of monetary and macroprudential policies? The recent trend
of central banks acquiring macroprudential portfolios is a reflection of these potential
merits.
In  addition,  the  results  seem  to  also  have  implications  for  institutional
strategies.  In  particular,  the  interaction  between  the  two policies  recommends  the
coordination which will improve outcomes, making it  advantageous to assign both
policies  to  a  single  authority,  usually  the  central  bank.  Given  that  the  results
exemplified  the strength of  that  policy mix  in the case of  lenders,  i.e.  banks,  the
institutional design should be built in a manner that prevent such institutions from
excessive risk-taking or bubbles,  motivated  by persistently  expansionary monetary
policies  and expected bailouts,  while  easing the burden on monetary policy.  Such
findings  emphasize  the  importance  of  factors  in  relevance  to  bank  balance  sheet
capacity and competition pressures. Without the coordination of the two policies may
increase the likelihood of a financial crisis originating by the accumulation of bank
risk.  The findings  shed  light  on  the  combined  role  of  monetary  policy  and bank
lending conditions. Monetary policy should pay more attention to financial stability,
while banking prudential policies should take into account the risk-taking incentives
possibly induced by low interest  rates. The combined role of monetary policy and
macroprudential  tools  can  be  buffers  that  ease  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy,
especially, during periods of financial stress. The attention to macroprudential policy
can enhance monetary policy’s credibility and transparency, while the central banks
can  enjoy  new  responsibilities  on  macroprudential  supervision  and  regulation  to
monitor banking/lending risks.
Further research could explore whether nonlinearities and potential breaks in
Taylor monetary rules affect the policy mix investigated here under that central banks
have asymmetric preferences for both inflation and the output gap.
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Appendix 1. Countries and macroprudential tools
_____________________________________________________________________
Full Sample:  127 countries
Low Income Countries: 19 countries
Burkina Faso (3) 1980-2015 Credit
Burundi (3) 1980-2015 Credit
Central African Republic (3) 1980-2015 Credit
Chad (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Ethiopia (3) 1984-2015 Credit
Gambia (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Haiti (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Liberia (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Madagascar (3) 1986-2015 Credit
Mali (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Mozambique (3) 1988-2015 Credit
Nepal (2) 1990-2015 Credit
Niger (3) 1988-2015 Credit
Rwanda (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Sierra Leone (3) 1988-2015 Credit
Tanzania (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Togo (3) 1988-2015 Credit
Uganda (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Zimbabwe (3) 1985-2015 Credit
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Lower Middle Income Countries:  30 countries
Armenia (3) 1991-2015 Asset
Bolivia (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Cameroon (3) 1988-2015 Credit
Cape Verde (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Cote d’Ivoire (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Egypt (3) 1985-2015 Credit
El Salvador (2) 1986-2015 Asset
Georgia (2) 1991-2015 Credit
Ghana (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Guatemala (2) 1991-2015 Asset
Honduras (3) 1993-2015 Asset
India (2) 1985-2015 Asset
Indonesia (2) 1985-2015 Asset
Kenya (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Mauritania (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Moldova (2) 1992-2015 Asset
Morocco (2) 1988-2015 Credit
Nicaragua (3) 1990-2015 Asset
Nigeria (3) 1986-2015 Credit
Pakistan (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Philippines (3) 1983-2015 Credit
Senegal (3) 1986-2015 Credit
Sri Lanka (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Sudan (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Tajikistan (2) 1993-2015 Credit
Ukraine (2) 1992-2015 Asset
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Uzbekistan (2) 1993-2015 Credit
Vietnam (3) 1990-2015 Asset
Yemen (3) 1992-2015 Credit
Zambia (3) 1985-2015 Credit
 
Upper Middle Income Countries:  42 countries
Albania (2) 1990-2015 Credit
Algeria (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Angola (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Azerbaijan (2) 1992-2015 Credit
Belarus (2) 1993-2015 Asset
Bosnia-Herzegovina (2) 1995-2015 Credit
Botswana (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Brazil (3) 1983-2015 Asset
Bulgaria (2) 1992-2015 Asset
China (2) 1993-2015 Asset
Colombia (2) 1987-2015 Credit
Costa Rica (2) 1985-2015 Asset
Cuba (3) 1995-2015 Credit
Dominican Republic (3) 1990-2015 Asset
Ecuador (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Fiji (3) 1991-2015 Credit
Gabon (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Grenada (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Iran (3) 1993-2015 Credit
Jamaica (2) 1990-2015 Credit
Jordan (2) 1989-2015 Credit
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Kazakhstan (3) 1993-2015 Credit
Lebanon (2) 1990-2015 Credit
Libya (3) 1988-2013 Credit
Malaysia (3) 1982-2015 Asset
Maldives (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Marshall Islands (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Mauritius (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Mexico (3) 1981-2015 Asset
Mongolia (3) 1995-2015 Credit
Namibia (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Panama (2) 1984-2015 Asset
Paraguay (2) 1988-2015 Credit
Peru (2) 1987-2015 Credit
Romania (1) 1993-2015 Asset
South Africa (3) 1982-2015 Asset
Suriname (3) 1990-2015 Credit
Thailand (3) 1983-2015 Credit
Tonga (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Tunisia (2) 1985-2013 Credit
Turkey (2) 1982-2015 Asset
Turkmenistan (2) 1993-2015 Credit
 
High Income Countries: 36 countries
Andorra (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Argentina (3) 1988-2015 Asset
Australia (1) 1982-2015 Asset
Bahamas (1) 1985-2015 Credit
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Bahrain (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Barbados (2) 1987-2015 Credit
Brunei (2) 1990-2015 Credit
Canada (2) 1982-2015 Asset
Chile (3) 1985-2015 Asset
Croatia (2) 1993-2015 Credit
Czech Republic (2) 1993-2015 Credit
Denmark (2) 1982-2015 Asset
Eurozone (2) 2001-2015 Credit
Hungary (1) 1993-2015 Credit
Iceland (2) 1990-2015 Credit
Israel (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Japan (2) 1981-2015 Credit
Kuwait (2) 1992-2015 Asset
New Zealand (2) 1983-2015 Asset
Norway (2) 1982-2015 Asset
Oman (3) 1985-2015 Credit
Poland (1) 1991-2015 Asset
Qatar (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Russia (2) 1993-2015 Credit
Saudi Arabia (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Singapore (2) 1983-2015 Asset
South Korea (2) 1981-2015 Credit
Sweden (2) 1983-2015 Asset
Switzerland (2) 1982-2015 Asset
Taiwan (2) 1985-2015 Credit
Trinidad & Tobago (2) 1990-2015 Credit
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United Arab Emirates (2) 1989-2015 Credit
United Kingdom (2) 1981-2015 Asset
United States (2) 1980-2015 Asset
Uruguay (2) 1986-2015 Credit
Venezuela (2) 1985-2015 Credit
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes:  The  number  in  parenthesis  denotes  whether  the  macroprudential  policy  is  in  relevance  to
restrictions on borrowers (1), lenders (2), or on capital flows (3). The period indicates the time span on
which the monetary rule has been estimated. The last column indicates whether the country is a capital-
based or bank-based economy.
Appendix 2. New (limited) country sample
_____________________________________________________________________
Low Income Countries = Haiti, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
Lower Middle Income Countries  =  Armenia,  Egypt,  El  Salvador,  Georgia,  Ghana,  India,
Indonesia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam
Upper  Middle  Income Countries  =  Albania,  Belarus,  Brazil,  Bulgaria,  China,  Colombia,
Jamaica,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Romania,  South  Africa,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey
High Income Countries  = Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Eurozone, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela
Appendix 3. Data description (quarterly)
_____________________________________________________________________
Countries           Output (constant-2010)       Prices (2010)           Interest rates 
_____________________________________________________________________
Burkina Faso             GDP             CPI                        Official
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Burundi                        GDP                  CPI                   Refinance  
Central African Republic GDP  CPI                   Prime lending  
Chad GDP  CPI        Prime lending
Ethiopia GDP  CPI        Benchmark
Gambia GDP  CPI        Policy rate
Haiti GDP  CPI        Benchmark
Liberia GDP  CPI        Liberia interest
Madagascar GDP  CPI        Official
Mali GDP  CPI        Official
Mozambique GDP  CPI           Standing Lending Facility
Nepal GDP  CPI        Bank
Niger GDP  CPI        Official
Rwanda GDP  CPI        Key Repo
Sierra Leone GDP  CPI                    BSL’s official
Tanzania GDP CPI         Official 
Togo GDP CPI                     Official
Uganda GDP CPI         Central Bank
Zimbabwe GDP CPI    Weighted Lending
Armenia GDP CPI          Refinancing
Bolivia GDP CPI         Bolivia Interest
Cameroon GDP CPI                     Prime Lending
Cape Verde GDP CPI          Rediscount
Cote d’Ivoire GDP CPI          Official
Egypt GDP CPI    Overnight Deposit
El Salvador GDP CPI                El Salvador Money
Georgia GDP CPI    7-day Refinancing
Ghana GDP CPI       Monetary Policy
Guatemala GDP CPI           Official
26
Honduras GDP CPI       Monetary Policy
India GDP CPI         Benchmark Repurchase
Indonesia GDP CPI      Official Discount
Kenya GDP CPI         Central Bank to August
        2005 and 91-day 
       Treasury Bill afterwards
Mauritania GDP CPI                    Discount
Moldova GDP CPI        Base
Morocco GDP CPI                    Official
Nicaragua GDP CPI        Overnight
Nigeria GDP CPI       Monetary Policy
Pakistan GDP CPI      Discount Ceiling
Philippines GDP CPI                    Reverse Repo
Senegal GDP CPI      Central Bank of 
West African States
Sri Lanka GDP CPI     Standing Lending Facility
Sudan GDP CPI      Murabaha Profits Margin
Tajikistan GDP CPI                     Refinancing
Ukraine GDP CPI         Discount
Uzbekistan GDP CPI                     Refinancing
Vietnam GDP CPI         Refinancing
Yemen GDP CPI               Benchmark Deposit
Zambia GDP CPI         Official
Albania GDP CPI         1-Week Repo
Algeria GDP CPI                     Discount
Angola GDP CPI     Discount to October 2011
  and Taxa Básica de Juro afterwards
Azerbaijan GDP CPI          Refinancing
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Belarus GDP CPI          Refinancing
Bosnia-Herzegovina GDP CPI           1 euro to 1.95583 KM
Botswana GDP CPI           Bank
Brazil GDP CPI   Overnight Lending
Bulgaria GDP CPI            Base Interest
China GDP CPI    One-Year Lending
Colombia GDP CPI            Intervention
Costa Rica GDP CPI       Monetary Policy
Cuba GDP CPI            1-month
Dominican Republic GDP CPI Overnight
Ecuador GDP CPI Benchmark Lending
Fiji GDP CPI                   Overnight Policy
Gabon GDP CPI        Bank of Central African
       States’ official
Grenada GDP CPI                Primary Lending
Iran GDP CPI         Bank Profit
Jamaica GDP CPI             30-day Certificate of
 Deposit
Jordan GDP CPI          Re-discount
Kazakhstan GDP CPI                   Overnight Policy
Lebanon GDP CPI Repo
Libya GDP CPI             Rediscount
Malaysia GDP CPI      Overnight Policy
Maldives GDP CPI            1-Week reverse Repo
Marshall Islands GDP CPI                       Primary Loans
Mauritius GDP CPI Repo
Mexico GDP CPI Overnight Interbank
Mongolia GDP CPI Policy
28
Namibia GDP CPI Repo
Panama GDP CPI          Money Market
Paraguay GDP CPI         14-Day Interest
Peru GDP CPI Reference
Romania GDP CPI Policy
South Africa GDP CPI Repo
Suriname GDP CPI Discount
Thailand GDP CPI      1-day repurchase
Tonga GDP CPI Base
Tunisia GDP CPI         Call for Tender
Turkey GDP CPI          1-Week Repo Lending
Turkmenistan GDP CPI Refinance
 Andorra GDP CPI Re-deposit
Argentina GDP CPI         Reverse Repo
Australia GDP CPI Cash
Bahamas GDP CPI Discount
Bahrain GDP CPI        1-Week Deposit
Barbados GDP CPI         3-Month T-Bill
Brunei GDP CPI          Prime Lending
Canada GDP CPI Target On
Chile GDP CPI       Monetary Policy
Croatia GDP CPI Lombard
Czech Republic GDP CPI Repo
Denmark GDP CPI Lending
Eurozone GDP Harmonized Key
Hungary GDP CPI Base
Iceland GDP CPI          7-Day Deposit
Israel GDP CPI Benchmark
29
Japan GDP CPI Call
Kuwait GDP CPI Discount
New Zealand GDP CPI Cash
Norway GDP CPI Key Policy
Oman GDP CPI Repo
Poland GDP CPI Reference
Qatar GDP CPI Repo
Russia GDP CPI Key
Saudi Arabia GDP CPI Repurchase
Singapore GDP CPI       Effective Exchange Rate
South Korea GDP CPI Base
Sweden GDP CPI Repo
Switzerland GDP CPI                SNB-Target Range
Taiwan GDP CPI           10-Day Loans
Trinidad & Tobago GDP CPI Repo
United Arab Emirates GDP CPI           Overnight Repurchase
United Kingdom GDP CPI Bank
United States GDP CPI Funds
Uruguay GDP CPI                    Monetary Policy
Venezuela GDP CPI Discount
_____________________________________________________________________
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Forward-looking Taylor rule estimates (with stock prices)
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0       Φ3        Φ1          Φ2 ρ J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Low Income Countries
Burkina Faso 0.963     0.003      0.614    0.229      0.809   [0.32]  0.86
[0.01]     [0.19]      [0.01]    [0.01]     [0.00]
Burundi 0.411     0.005      0.446     0.253     0.826   [0.58]  0.72
[0.29]     [0.07]      [0.04]    [0.05]     [0.00]
Central African Republic 0.329     0.004      0.594     0.268      0.861   [0.52] 0.66
[0.28]     [0.19]      [0.03]    [0.05] [0.00]
Chad 0.334     0.005      0.607     0.308      0.869   [0.53] 0.61
[0.34]     [0.20]      [0.01]     [0.05] [0.00]
Ethiopia 0.483     0.000      0.504     0.058      0.657   [0.40] 0.52
[0.24]     [0.35]      [0.05]     [0.05] [0.01]
Gambia 0.408     0.000      0.028   23.139       0.725  [0.33] 0.56
[0.29]     [0.26]      [0.05]     [0.00] [0.00]
Haiti 0.342     0.006     0.048     1.326       0.811   [0.40] 0.61
[0.29]     [0.10]      [0.08]     [0.03] [0.00]
Liberia 0.412     0.005     0.033     0.492       0.785   [0.32] 0.60
[0.27]     [0.15]      [0.05]    [0.05] [0.00]
Madagascar 0.339     0.002     0.417     1.682       0.839   [0.41] 0.65
[0.36]     [0.29]      [0.07]     [0.04] [0.00]
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Mali 0.458     0.001     0.044     0.837       0.852   [0.50] 0.70
[0.31]     [0.26]      [0.06]    [0.01] [0.00]
Mozambique 0.430     0.000     0.038     0.745       0.805   [0.57] 0.69
[0.29]     [0.46]       [0.07]    [0.05] [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0      Φ3          Φ1              Φ2    ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Nepal 0.361      0.009     1.174     0.031       0.765  [0.49] 0.61
[0.37]      [0.10]     [0.01]    [0.20]  [0.00]
Niger 0.358      0.004     0.032     0.774       0.702  [0.50] 0.68
[0.30]      [0.27]      [0.10]    [0.05]  [0.00]
Rwanda 0.552      0.001      0.929     0.233      0.605  [0.42] 0.57
[0.04]      [0.30]        [0.01]   [0.01]  [0.00]
Sierra Leone 0.436      0.002      0.031     6.784      0.813  [0.36] 0.68
[0.29]      [0.25]        [0.08]     [0.02]  [0.00]
Tanzania 0.554      0.009      0.128     0.602      0.746  [0.51] 0.70
[0.31]      [0.10]        [0.10]     [0.01]  [0.00]
Togo 0.430      0.000      0.151     0.628      0.774  [0.50] 0.63
[0.34]      [0.40]        [0.09]     [0.01]  [0.00]
Uganda 0.365      0.004      0.045     0.538      0.842  [0.60] 0.68
[0.36]      [0.24]        [0.08]     [0.01]  [0.00]
Zimbabwe 0.352      0.013      0.040     0.351      0.754  [0.52] 0.55
[0.39]      [0.09]       [0.10]    [0.04]  [0.00]
Lower Middle Income Countries
Armenia 0.432      0.007       1.152    0.041      0.863  [0.60] 0.71
[0.39]      [0.10]       [0.01]    [0.10]  [0.00]
Bolivia 0.582    0.005         0.849    0.038      0.801  [0.55] 0.66
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[0.37]    [0.19]         [0.02]    [0.10]  [0.00]
Cameroon 0.351    0.000         0.038    0.502      0.856  [0.53] 0.71
[0.39]    [0.38]         [0.10]   [0.04]  [0.00]
Cape Verde 0.426    0.000         0.035    0.379      0.814  [0.51] 0.64
[0.32]    [0.37]         [0.10]   [0.05]  [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0      Φ3          Φ1              Φ2    ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Cote d’Ivoire 0.352    0.001         0.033    0.319      0.759  [0.52] 0.54
[0.38]    [0.43]         [0.10]    [0.08]  [0.00]
Egypt 0.224    0.007         0.038    0.006      0.652  [0.60] 0.71
[0.02]    [0.10]         [0.05]    [0.24]  [0.01]
El Salvador 0.493    0.008         0.464     0.009     0.723  [0.50] 0.72
[0.34]    [0.10]         [0.05]    [0.28]  [0.00]
Georgia 0.461    0.005         0.051     0.588     0.886  [0.62] 0.77
[0.40]    [0.10]         [0.10]    [0.01]  [0.00]
Ghana 0.918    0.000          0.785 0.581  0.855  [0.32] 0.80
[0.10]    [0.27]          [0.01]   [0.05]  [0.00]
Guatemala 0.363    0.005          0.288 0.095    0.742  [0.41] 0.60
[0.36]    [0.22]          [0.03]    [0.05]  [0.01]
Honduras 0.421    0.000          0.245  0.071    0.659  [0.41] 0.62
[0.37]    [0.40]          [0.05]    [0.09]    [0.01]
India 0.563    0.010          0.178 0.354    0.920  [0.51] 0.77
[0.39]    [0.10]          [0.05]    [0.03]    [0.00]
Indonesia 0.935      0.005        0.491 0.004    0.928  [0.65] 0.76
[0.02]      [0.10]       [0.01]     [0.39]    [0.00]
Kenya 0.927      0.000        2.593 0.585    0.849  [0.68] 0.65
[0.04]      [0.41] [0.01]  [0.07]    [0.00]
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Mauritania 0.811      0.000 0.925 0.239    0.746  [0.51] 0.77
[0.05]      [0.46] [0.05]  [0.05]    [0.01]
Moldova 0.460      0.002 0.165 0.148    0.637  [0.49] 0.58
[0.44]      [0.31] [0.01]  [0.28]    [0.01]
TABLE 1 Continued
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Country   Φ0        Φ3 Φ1   Φ2     ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Morocco 0.429      0.005 0.926 0.038   0.916  [0.50] 0.69
[0.32]      [0.26] [0.01]  [0.06]   [0.00]
Nicaragua 0.358      0.001 0.646 0.000   0.752  [0.47] 0.66
[0.32]      [0.39] [0.01]  [0.29]   [0.01]
Nigeria 2.361      0.000 0.812 0.029 0.828   [0.24] 0.60
[0.01]      [0.53] [0.01] [0.41]   [0.01]
Pakistan 2.005      0.003 0.424 0.529    0.938  [0.58] 0.68
[0.29]      [0.10] [0.01]  [0.01]   [0.00]
Philippines 0.453      0.000 1.185 0.034    0.994  [0.71] 0.70
[0.48]      [0.10] [0.01]   [0.30]   [0.00]
Senegal 0.314      0.000 0.228 0.337    0.701  [0.58] 0.59
[0.41]      [0.57] [0.05]  [0.05]    [0.01]
Sri Lanka 0.883      0.001 0.269 0.634    0.755  [0.51] 0.52
[0.40]      [0.42] [0.08] [0.01]   [0.00]
Sudan 0.256    0.000 0.085 0.336    0.639  [0.38] 0.41
[0.32]    [0.58] [0.33]   [0.05]  [0.01]
Tajikistan 0.425    0.000 0.719 0.048    0.759  [0.44] 0.50
[0.48]    [0.42] [0.01]  [0.26]    [0.00]
Ukraine 0.808    0.003 0.506 0.033    0.784  [0.51] 0.55
[0.25]    [0.10] [0.01]   [0.29]   [0.00]
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Uzbekistan 0.514    0.000 0.314 0.031    0.752  [0.46] 0.50
[0.32]    [0.49] [0.05]  [0.31]    [0.00]
Vietnam 3.209    0.004 0.098 0.408    0.954  [0.48] 0.67
[0.07]    [0.10] [0.14]  [0.04]    [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
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Country   Φ0      Φ3  Φ1         Φ2     ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Yemen 0.326    0.000 0.030 0.391   0.659   [0.41] 0.52
[0.44]    [0.38] [0.35]  [0.09]   [0.01]
Zambia 0.485    0.000 0.048 0.257   0.636   [0.40] 0.49
[0.34]    [0.45] [0.30]   [0.05]  [0.01]
Upper Middle Income Countries
Albania 0.263    0.000 0.438 0.031    0.685  [0.46] 0.53
[0.60]    [0.19] [0.05]  [0.27]    [0.00]
Algeria 0.349    0.000 0.216 0.041    0.796  [0.58] 0.47
[0.38]    [0.52] [0.05]   [0.20]   [0.00]
Angola 0.361    0.000 0.032 0.303    0.610  [0.42] 0.41
[0.45]    [0.49] [0.30]   [0.05]   [0.01]
Azerbaijan 0.514      0.000 0.051 0.325    0.683  [0.49] 0.40
[0.30]    [0.42] [0.27]   [0.05]   [0.00]
Belarus 0.618    0.001 0.032 0.339    0.662  [0.50] 0.41
[0.31]    [0.38] [0.27]   [0.05]   [0.00]
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.526      0.000 0.034 0.387    0.639  [0.41] 0.43
[0.32]    [0.44] [0.38]  [0.05]    [0.01]
Botswana 0.325    0.002 0.021 0.411    0.805  [0.52] 0.60
[0.39]    [0.43] [0.38]  [0.01]    [0.00]
Brazil -4.994    0.008 0.122 0.618    0.724  [0.69] 0.51
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[0.40]    [0.10] [0.05] [0.01]  [0.00]
Bulgaria -0.109    0.003 0.101 0.194    0.415  [0.47] 0.42
[0.30]    [0.17] [0.05]  [0.10]    [0.01]
China 1.647    0.010 2.452 0.774     0.826 [0.64] 0.77
[0.07]    [0.09] [0.01] [0.05]   [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0      Φ3  Φ1         Φ2     ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Colombia 0.549    0.000 0.365 0.137     0.348 [0.51] 0.45
[0.30]    [0.28] [0.05]   [0.17]    [0.05]
Costa Rica 0.440    0.000 0.762 0.174     0.551 [0.32] 0.60
[0.40]    [0.31] [0.01]   [0.08]   [0.01]
Cuba -0.411    0.000 0.049 0.418   0.454 [0.36] 0.51
[0.40]    [0.54] [0.42]   [0.01]  [0.04]
Dominican Republic -1.291    0.000 2.139 0.134   0.205  [0.58] 0.78
[0.04]    [0.62] [0.01]   [0.40]  [0.07]
Ecuador -4.962     0.000 0.260 5.452   0.225  [0.54] 0.57
[0.42]     [0.40] [0.37]   [0.01]  [0.05]
Fiji 0.416     0.000 0.319 0.642   0.525  [0.41] 0.58
[0.42]     [0.39] [0.05]  [0.01]   [0.04]
Gabon 0.347     0.000 0.074 0.595   0.615  [0.56] 0.69
[0.40]     [0.53] [0.10]  [0.01]   [0.01]
Grenada 0.330     0.001 0.022 0.303   0.538  [0.41] 0.42
[0.51]     [0.44] [0.36]  [0.01]   [0.02]
Iran 0.250     0.000 0.736 0.411   0.586  [0.52] 0.80
[0.30]     [0.41] [0.00]  [0.05]   [0.01]
Jamaica 1.452     0.000 0.140 0.736   0.826  [0.58] 0.25
[0.35]     [0.40] [0.20]   [0.03] [0.00]
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Jordan 0.173     0.000 0.875 0.657   0.949  [0.58] 0.81
[0.38]     [0.58] [0.01]   [0.04]  [0.00]
Kazakhstan 0.356     0.004 0.240 0.452   0.949  [0.71] 0.73 
[0.33]     [0.51] [0.08]   [0.01]  [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0      Φ3  Φ1         Φ2     ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Lebanon 0.436     0.002 0.117 0.460   0.581  [0.47] 0.60
[0.36]     [0.49] [0.08]  [0.01]   [0.01]
Libya 0.340     0.000 0.159 0.527   0.693  [0.48] 0.69
[0.45]     [0.59] [0.10]  [0.01]   [0.00]
Malaysia -0.060     0.004 0.072 0.227  0.841 [0.50] 0.78
[0.39]     [0.18] [0.45]   [0.05] [0.00]
Maldives 0.385     0.000 0.307 0.040  0.642  [0.44] 0.61
[0.39]     [0.62] [0.02]   [0.28] [0.01]
Marshall Islands 0.324     0.000 0.409 0.032  0.683  [0.55] 0.67
[0.42]     [0.65] [0.01]   [0.32]  [0.00]
Mauritius 0.573     0.000 0.506 0.134   0.601 [0.49] 0.60
[0.27]     [0.44] [0.01]  [0.05]   [0.00]
Mexico 0.389     0.005 1.142 0.226  0.939 [0.48] 0.63
[0.38]     [0.10] [0.01]  [0.30]  [0.00]
Mongolia 0.385     0.000 2.185 0.774  0.702  [0.45] 0.61
[0.46]     [0.58] [0.01]  [0.05]  [0.00]
Namibia 1.386      0.000 0.735 0.202   0.515 [0.52] 0.49
[0.04]     [0.41] [0.01]  [0.04]  [0.01]
Panama 0.536      0.002 0.454 0.032  0.619  [0.58] 0.54
[0.35]     [0.28] [0.01]   [0.36] [0.00]
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Paraguay 0.585      0.000 0.511 0.476  0.750  [0.68] 0.60
[0.32]      [0.24] [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.00]
Peru 0.733      0.001 0.560 0.172  0.784  [0.65] 0.73
[0.29]      [0.19] [0.01]   [0.10] [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
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Country   Φ0      Φ3  Φ1         Φ2     ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Romania 1.143      0.000 0.783 0.619 0.860   [0.22] 0.65
[0.10]      [0.29] [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01]
South Africa 0.104      0.005 0.041 0.311   0.839  [0.49] 0.79
[0.48]      [0.19] [0.41]  [0.04]   [0.00]
Suriname 0.426     0.000 0.032 0.410   0.742  [0.51] 0.70
[0.39]     [0.48] [0.34]  [0.01]   [0.00]
Thailand 0.254     0.002 0.257 0.006    0.748  [0.43] 0.81
[0.28]     [0.41] [0.01] [0.72]   [0.00]
Tonga 0.514     0.000 0.022 0.011    0.188  [0.23] 0.16
[0.33]     [0.42] [0.45] [0.62]  [0.14]
Tunisia 0.138     0.000 0.124 0.051   0.918  [0.55] 0.82
[0.30]     [0.45] [0.01]   [0.10]  [0.00]
Turkey -1.002     0.006 0.011 0.153   0.954  [0.58] 0.78
[0.26]     [0.15] [0.50]  [0.05]   [0.00]
Turkmenistan 0.583     0.000 0.015 0.219   0.516  [0.40] 0.48
[0.35]     [0.45] [0.41]  [0.05]   [0.02]
High Income Countries
Andorra 0.514     0.000 0.492 0.021   0.585  [0.58] 0.61
[0.18]     [0.49] [0.01]  [0.46]   [0.01]
Argentina 2.458     0.001 0.513 0.338   0.721  [0.58]  0.40
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[0.27]     [0.35] [0.05]   [0.05]  [0.01]  
Australia -0.245     0.010 0.335 0.411   0.608  [0.55]  0.80
[0.30]     [0.11] [0.05]   [0.36]  [0.00]
Bahamas 0.962     0.000 0.048 0.446   0.642  [0.41] 0.52
[0.15]     [0.31] [0.30]  [0.01]   [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
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Country   Φ0       Φ3    Φ1   Φ2    ρ   J      Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Bahrain 0.784      0.000 0.035 0.324   0.559  [0.49] 0.61
[0.28]      [0.45] [0.40]  [0.04]   [0.01]
Barbados 0.606      0.000 0.032 0.354   0.559  [0.51] 0.55
[0.36]     [0.52] [0.29]  [0.04]   [0.01]
Brunei 0.748      0.000 0.445 0.041   0.692  [0.54] 0.70
[0.30]     [0.43] [0.02]   [0.30]  [0.00]
Canada -0.241      0.010 0.051 0.303  0.884   [0.68] 0.78
[0.35]     [0.11] [0.44]   [0.01]  [0.00]
Chile -2.361      0.002 0.427 0.319  0.624   [0.51] 0.40
[0.32]     [0.19] [0.01]  [0.06]  [0.01]
Croatia 1.562      0.000 0.213 0.519  0.364  [0.48] 0.68
[0.10]     [0.42] [0.10]   [0.05]  [0.05]
Czech Republic 1.052        0.002 1.046 0.284 0.901  [0.15] 0.64
[0.10]     [0.18] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Denmark -0.204      0.005 0.302 0.194   0.825  [0.38] 0.77
[0.34]     [0.20] [0.01]   [0.05]  [0.00]
Eurozone 3.084     0.010 2.137 1.005    0.899 [0.27] 0.78
[0.01]     [0.10] [0.01] [0.01]  [0.00]
Hungary 1.016     0.000 1.146 0.362  0.835  [0.20] 0.69
[0.10]     [0.10] [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01]
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Iceland -0.784     0.003 0.337 0.260    0.801  [0.55] 0.82
[0.29]     [0.10] [0.01]  [0.04]    [0.00]
Israel 0.015     0.006 0.314 0.050    0.838  [0.62] 0.83
[0.30]     [0.00] [0.01]   [0.10]   [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0      Φ3  Φ1         Φ2     ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Japan 0.035     0.007 0.426 0.010    0.918  [0.69] 0.63
[0.41]     [0.09] [0.05]   [0.41]   [0.00]
Kuwait 1.275     0.000 0.031 0.227    0.630  [0.46] 0.53
[0.09]     [0.45] [0.41]   [0.05]   [0.00]
New Zealand -0.023     0.008 1.114 0.104    0.856  [0.67] 0.79
[0.63]     [0.09] [0.01] [0.05]  [0.00]
Norway 0.835     0.000 0.229 0.137    0.714  [0.53] 0.72
[0.05]     [0.14] [0.01]  [0.05]    [0.00]
Oman 0.635     0.000 0.022 0.287    0.612  [0.46] 0.51
[0.26]     [0.49] [0.39]  [0.04]    [0.01]
Poland 0.856     0.000 1.358 0.730  0.916  [0.17] 0.65
[0.19]     [0.28] [0.01] [0.09]  [0.01]
Qatar 0.712     0.000 0.031 0.335  0.684  [0.55] 0.62
[0.19]     [0.44] [0.39]  [0.05]  [0.00]
Russia 0.558     0.000 0.264 0.223   0.902  [0.51] 0.73
[0.03]     [0.48] [0.05]   [0.01]  [0.00]
Saudi Arabia 1.894     0.001 0.023 0.144   0.683  [0.63] 0.81
[0.03]     [0.54] [0.46]   [0.02]   [0.00]
Singapore -0.286     0.002 0.118 0.337   0.901  [0.58] 0.72
[0.02]     [0.16] [0.30]   [0.01]   [0.00]   
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South Korea 0.245      0.005 0.051 0.217    0.925 [0.70] 0.78 
[0.10]      [0.19] [0.39]   [0.04]   [0.00]
Sweden -0.314      0.003 0.103 0.078    0.825  [0.55] 0.80
[0.28]      [0.34] [0.05]   [0.10]   [0.00]
TABLE 1 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0      Φ3  Φ1         Φ2     ρ   J         Ṝ2
_____________________________________________________________________
Switzerland -0.210      0.004 0.353 0.440    0.916  [0.68] 0.78
[0.39]      [0.19] [0.05]   [0.01]   [0.00]
Taiwan 0.172      0.000 0.094 0.312    0.874  [0.61] 0.60
[0.04]      [0.55] [0.10]  [0.03]   [0.00]
Trinidad & Tobago 1.056      0.000 0.041 0.706   0.652  [0.48] 0.59
[0.02]      [0.51] [0.05] [0.01]  [0.00]
United Arab Emirates 0.886      0.000 0.031 0.325   0.581   [0.50] 0.52
[0.14]      [0.53] [0.41]   [0.04]  [0.00]
United Kingdom 2.352      0.010 1.487 0.735   0.919  [0.70] 0.73
[0.10]      [0.05] [0.01]  [0.01]   [0.00]
United States 1.003        0.006 1.426 0.443   0.867  [0.68] 0.78
[0.06]      [0.06] [0.01]   [0.01]  [0.00]
Uruguay 0.745       0.000 0.023 0.617    0.490  [0.50] 0.51
[0.19]      [0.52] [0.48]  [0.01]   [0.00]
Venezuela 0.775      0.000 0.158 1.004  0.820  [0.43] 0.47
[0.19]      [0.58] [0.46]   [0.01]  [0.00]
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: The estimations are based on errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using
the Newey and West (1987) procedure. J-statistic is the minimized value of the objective function that
tests the null hypothesis of the over-identification restriction. Figures in parentheses denote p-values.
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TABLE 2
Monetary and macroprudential policy model estimates (monetary rules with stock
prices): Ф3 = intercept + b1 Ф1 + b2 Ф2 + b3 mp + b4 target + b5 country
_____________________________________________________________________
    Coefficient           Model 1           Model 2           Model 3
_____________________________________________________________________
       Intercept  6.636  6.215  5.938
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
b1 -0.149 -0.142 -0.136
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
b2 -0.071 -0.064 -0.060
[0.04] [0.02] [0.03]






    R2-adjusted  0.42  0.50  0.54
          D-W  1.99  1.98  1.98
  No. of countries  127  127  127
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: D-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Figures in brackets denote p-values.
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TABLE 3
Monetary and macroprudential policy model estimates (monetary rules with stock
prices):Ф3 = intercept + b1 Ф1 + b2 Ф2 + b3 mp + b4 target + b5 country
Country classification based on the type of macroprudential tool adopted
_____________________________________________________________________
    Coefficient           Lenders         Borrowers     Capital flows
_____________________________________________________________________
       Intercept  2.573  1.218  3.085
[0.01] [0.03] [0.00]
b1 -0.119 -0.075 -0.107
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
b2 -0.047 -0.029 -0.052
[0.02] [0.05] [0.02]
b3 -0.328 -0.073 -0.242
[0.00] [0.03] [0.00]
b4 -0.064 -0.030 -0.047
[0.01] [0.04] [0.02]
b5  0.052 0.021  0.044
[0.01] [0.04] [0.01]
    R2-adjusted  0.52  0.27  0.45
          D-W  1.99  1.96  1.98
  No. of countries  60  5  62
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to Table 2.
48
TABLE 4
Monetary policy and macroprudential policy model estimates (country
classifications)
_____________________________________________________________________
Country classification:  Low Income     Lower Middle Upper Middle       High
    Coefficient               Income Income              Income
_____________________________________________________________________
       Intercept        4.149         3.266    5.239       5.705
       [0.00]        [0.01]    [0.00]      [0.00]
b1      -0.063       -0.089   -0.119                -0.140
      [0.03]        [0.03]    [0.00]      [0.00]
b2      -0.055       -0.038   -0.052                -0.096
      [0.01]        [0.06]    [0.04]      [0.00]
b3      -0.692       -0.506   -0.396     -0.285
      [0.00]        [0.00]    [0.00]      [0.01]
b4      -0.097       -0.074   -0.079     -0.056
      [0.00]        [0.00]    [0.00]      [0.01]
    R2-adjusted        0.41         0.38     0.56       0.60
          D-W        1.94         1.96     1.96       1.99
 No. of countries        19         30     42       36
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Table 1.
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TABLE 5
Forward-looking Taylor rule estimates (with house prices)
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0       Φ3          Φ1  Φ2     ρ    J         Ṝ2
___________________________________________________________________________
Low Income Countries
Haiti 0.251     0.047           1.118        0.024      0.574   [0.39]   0.67
[0.18]     [0.01]          [0.02]       [0.00]  [0.00]
Rwanda 0.368             0.019          0.961        0.245      0.629   [0.53]   0.69
[0.09]     [0.05]         [0.00]        [0.00]  [0.00]
Tanzania 0.526             0.022          0.138        0.594      0.719   [0.55]   0.87
[0.14]      [0.04]         [0.10]        [0.00]  [0.00]
Zimbabwe 0.316      0.028          0.037        0.442      0.737   [0.60]   0.71
[0.33]      [0.03]         [0.06]        [0.02]  [0.00]
Lower Middle Income Countries
Armenia 0.406      0.028         1.175    0.063     0.885   [0.68]   0.85
[0.35]      [0.01]         [0.00]    [0.05]  [0.00]             
Egypt 0.194    0.027         0.068    0.015     0.647   [0.64]   0.88
[0.05]    [0.05]         [0.05]    [0.13]  [0.01]
El Salvador 0.493    0.036         0.439     0.029     0.711   [0.53]   0.86
[0.18]    [0.03]         [0.05]    [0.15]  [0.00]
Georgia 0.385    0.038         0.074     0.692     0.883   [0.66]   0.87
[0.39]    [0.05]         [0.05]    [0.00]  [0.00]
Ghana 0.683    0.024          0.736 0.677  0.825   [0.31]   0.90
[0.10]    [0.09]          [0.00]   [0.02]  [0.00]
50
India 0.396    0.048          0.162 0.502     0.903   [0.50]  0.89 
[0.37]    [0.01]          [0.02]    [0.00]    [0.00]
Indonesia 0.734      0.042          0.486 0.062    0.925    [0.68]  0.85
[0.04]      [0.03]          [0.01]        [0.15]    [0.00]             
Morocco 0.392      0.041        0.916 0.069    0.920    [0.52]  0.87
[0.32]      [0.05]        [0.01]  [0.02]   [0.00]
TABLE 5 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0       Φ3          Φ1  Φ2     ρ    J         Ṝ2
___________________________________________________________________________
Nicaragua 0.338            0.049        0.582 0.019    0.711   [0.51]   0.83
[0.35]            [0.01]         [0.02]  [0.14]   [0.00]
Nigeria 2.364      0.035         0.774 0.056 0.824    [0.25]   0.78
[0.01]      [0.04]         [0.01] [0.18]   [0.00]
Pakistan 1.952      0.051         0.416 0.604    0.928   [0.65]   0.88
[0.19]      [0.01]         [0.01]  [0.00]   [0.00]
Philippines 0.426      0.058         1.185 0.053    0.904   [0.70]   0.84
[0.29]      [0.05]         [0.00]   [0.11]   [0.00]
Ukraine 0.684    0.064         0.512 0.053    0.816  [0.64]    0.70
[0.20]    [0.00]         [0.02]   [0.11]   [0.00]
Uzbekistan 0.489    0.033         0.314 0.062    0.726   [0.51]   0.68
[0.28]    [0.06]         [0.05]  [0.14]    [0.00]
Vietnam 2.894    0.004          0.073 0.652    0.925   [0.58]   0.83
[0.06]    [0.38]          [0.19]      [0.01]    [0.00]
Upper Middle Income Countries
Albania 0.239    0.058          0.592 0.037    0.685   [0.52]   0.69
[0.44]    [0.01]          [0.01]      [0.26]    [0.00]
Belarus 0.518    0.038          0.034 0.405    0.652   [0.54]   0.58
[0.27]    [0.05]          [0.30]      [0.04]    [0.00]
Brazil -3.429    0.074          0.126 0.749    0.715   [0.69]   0.66
[0.21]    [0.00]          [0.06] [0.00]  [0.00]
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Bulgaria -0.106    0.029          0.149 0.346    0.406    [0.46]   0.53
[0.23]    [0.05]          [0.03]  [0.05]    [0.01]
China 1.458    0.079          2.457 0.784     0.816   [0.61]   0.85
[0.08]    [0.00]          [0.00] [0.05]  [0.00]             
Colombia 0.542    0.019          0.355 0.184     0.325   [0.47]   0.57
[0.28]    [0.18]          [0.05]      [0.09]    [0.05]
TABLE 5 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0       Φ3          Φ1   Φ2     ρ    J         Ṝ2
___________________________________________________________________________
Jamaica 1.262     0.025        0.171 0.804    0.813   [0.62]   0.38
[0.31]     [0.10]        [0.10]   [0.01]   [0.00]
Jordan 0.147     0.021        0.825 0.699    0.924   [0.58]   0.87
[0.30]     [0.09]        [0.00]        [0.01]   [0.00]
Kazakhstan 0.341     0.033        0.294 0.528    0.931   [0.73]   0.89 
[0.29]     [0.05]        [0.05]        [0.00]   [0.00]             
Malaysia -0.057     0.048        0.106 0.315    0.820   [0.51]   0.90
[0.28]     [0.01]        [0.28]        [0.02]   [0.00]
Mexico 0.384     0.056        1.175 0.293    0.919   [0.49]   0.80
[0.22]     [0.00]        [0.00]  [0.13]   [0.00]
Paraguay 0.547      0.024        0.511 0.583    0.725    [0.68]  0.78
[0.28]      [0.06]        [0.01]        [0.01]   [0.00]
Peru 0.736      0.028        0.614 0.208    0.773    [0.70]  0.89
[0.20]      [0.06]        [0.00]   [0.05]   [0.00]
Romania 1.135      0.048        0.837 0.624 0.825     [0.21]  0.79
[0.14]      [0.01]        [0.01] [0.01]   [0.01]
South Africa 0.128      0.073        0.039 0.395    0.814    [0.48]  0.91
[0.23]      [0.00]        [0.31]        [0.01]   [0.00]
Thailand 0.240     0.039        0.266 0.027    0.725    [0.51]  0.90 
[0.20]     [0.05]        [0.01] [0.41]   [0.00]
Tunisia 0.144     0.041        0.135 0.084    0.903    [0.55]  0.93
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[0.22]     [0.05]        [0.01]        [0.07]   [0.00]
Turkey -0.935     0.066        0.084 0.264    0.914    [0.60]  0.90
[0.27]     [0.01]        [0.15]        [0.03]   [0.00]
High Income Countries
Argentina 2.258     0.042        0.711 0.324   0.715     [0.62]  0.53
[0.19]     [0.05]        [0.01]        [0.08]   [0.01]  
TABLE 5 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0       Φ3          Φ1   Φ2     ρ    J         Ṝ2
___________________________________________________________________________
Australia -0.248     0.104        0.436 0.477    0.606   [0.61]  0.90
[0.21]     [0.00]        [0.01]        [0.12]    [0.00]
Bahamas 0.935     0.019        0.058 0.496    0.624   [0.40]  0.61
[0.16]     [0.08]        [0.20]        [0.01]   [0.00] 
Bahrain 0.744      0.045        0.035 0.382    0.526   [0.53]  0.78
[0.18]      [0.01]        [0.27]        [0.02]   [0.01]
Canada -0.239      0.040        0.094 0.382    0.910   [0.70]  0.91
[0.23]     [0.00]        [0.14]        [0.00]   [0.00]
Chile -2.341      0.019        0.584 0.340    0.613   [0.59]  0.52
[0.23]     [0.07]        [0.00]        [0.05]   [0.01]
Croatia 1.481      0.039        0.258 0.602    0.415   [0.42]  0.83
[0.10]     [0.10]        [0.05]   [0.01]   [0.02]
Czech Republic 1.026        0.020        1.113 0.349 0.911   [0.15]   0.79
[0.11]     [0.05]        [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Denmark -0.192      0.036        0.307 0.385    0.886   [0.41]   0.92
[0.24]     [0.04]        [0.02]        [0.01]   [0.00]
Eurozone 2.938     0.051         2.162 0.914    0.904   [0.24]   0.89
[0.00]     [0.01]         [0.00] [0.01]  [0.00]
Hungary 0.918     0.017         1.201 0.428  0.912   [0.21]   0.85
[0.19]     [0.06]         [0.01] [0.00]  [0.00]
Iceland -0.725     0.023         0.325 0.439     0.835   [0.48]   0.92
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[0.20]     [0.06]         [0.03]       [0.01]     [0.00]
Israel 0.058     0.039         0.358 0.105     0.864   [0.60]   0.92
[0.31]     [0.05]         [0.01]       [0.07]     [0.00]             
Japan 0.061     0.043         0.336 0.074     0.918   [0.69]   0.81
[0.24]     [0.01]         [0.07]       [0.10]     [0.00]
TABLE 5 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0       Φ3          Φ1   Φ2     ρ    J         Ṝ2
___________________________________________________________________________
Kuwait 1.261     0.018        0.031 0.204    0.691   [0.44]   0.68
[0.10]     [0.13]        [0.35]         [0.02]   [0.00]
New Zealand -0.021     0.062        1.214 0.105    0.911   [0.69]   0.91
[0.45]     [0.00]        [0.00]  [0.05]  [0.00]
Norway 0.685     0.016        0.237  0.266    0.788   [0.50]  0.86
[0.29]     [0.05]        [0.03]   [0.02]    [0.00]
Poland 0.756     0.020        1.647  0.813   0.918  [0.16]   0.82
[0.19]     [0.05]        [0.01]  [0.04]    [0.01]
Qatar 0.584     0.016        0.031  0.411     0.782  [0.47]   0.79
[0.22]     [0.18]        [0.29]         [0.02]    [0.00]
Russia 0.525     0.046        0.259  0.291     0.913  [0.50]   0.86
[0.03]     [0.05]        [0.05]         [0.00]    [0.00]
Saudi Arabia 1.762     0.010        0.035  0.194    0.748  [0.61]   0.90
[0.03]     [0.13]        [0.31]         [0.01]    [0.00]
Singapore -0.295     0.037         0.165  0.402    0.937  [0.53]   0.86
[0.02]     [0.02]         [0.12]        [0.01]    [0.00]   
South Korea 0.238      0.048         0.082  0.385    0.947  [0.72]   0.91 
[0.14]      [0.01]         [0.13]        [0.01]    [0.00]
Sweden -0.312      0.037         0.125  0.186    0.893   [0.55]  0.90
[0.22]      [0.05]         [0.05]        [0.05]    [0.00] 
Switzerland -0.213      0.052         0.406  0.485    0.971   [0.69]   0.92
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[0.31]      [0.00]         [0.02]        [0.01]    [0.00]
Taiwan 0.158      0.038         0.142  0.402    0.925   [0.63]   0.89
[0.07]      [0.05]         [0.05]        [0.00]    [0.00]
United Kingdom 2.261      0.074         1.613  0.791    0.965   [0.72]   0.94
[0.11]      [0.00]         [0.00]        [0.00]    [0.00]
TABLE 5 Continued
_____________________________________________________________________
Country   Φ0       Φ3          Φ1   Φ2     ρ    J        Ṝ2
___________________________________________________________________________
United States 1.115        0.057        1.436 0.482    0.924   [0.58]   0.94
[0.03]      [0.00]        [0.00]        [0.01]   [0.00]
Uruguay 0.645       0.008        0.063 0.678    0.563   [0.54]   0.60
[0.20]      [0.27]        [0.10]  [0.00]   [0.00]
Venezuela 0.684      0.016        0.252 1.172    0.874   [0.44]   0.59
[0.21]      [0.10]        [0.13]   [0.00]   [0.00]
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to Table 1.
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TABLE 6
Monetary policy and macroprudential policy model estimates (monetary rules with
house prices): 
Ф3 = intercept + b1 Ф1 + b2 Ф2 + b3 mp + b4 target + b5 country
_____________________________________________________________________
    Coefficient           Model 1           Model 2           Model 3
_____________________________________________________________________
       Intercept  6.328  6.214  6.075
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
b1 -0.138 -0.133 -0.131
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
b2 -0.069 -0.064 -0.060
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05]






    R2-adjusted  0.47  0.55  0.60
          D-W  1.99  1.98  1.97
  No. of countries  67  67  67
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Table 2. 
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